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INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) issued 
its first judgment on a gay rights case from the Russian Federation. 
Alekseyev v. Russia resulted in a finding that the Russian government 
had violated Articles 11, 13, and 14 of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention) when the city of Moscow banned the plaintiff, Nikolai 
Alekseyev, and other gay rights activists from holding a public 
demonstration in support of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) rights in 2006, 2007, and 2008, specifically gay pride 
marches, rallies, and pickets. This ruling follows a recent trend in 
both the European Union and the United Nations of bold statements 
in favor of gay rights, and makes a strong case for LGBT rights of 
assembly.1 
I 
UNSANCTIONED PRIDE, SANCTIONED HATE 
In 2006, gay activists in Russia organized what they hoped would 
be the first gay pride parade in the Russian Federation. Organizers, 
including Nikolai Alekseyev (the plaintiff in this case) and his LGBT 
rights group, Gay Russia, chose May 27, 2006, as the date for a march 
and rally to support and promote the rights of Russia’s LGBT 
community.2 Beginning in February of that year, the local government 
 
1 The U.N. released its first ever report on LGBT human rights in December 2011. The 
report detailed the global battles facing sexual minorities, noting that “LGBT people are 
often targets of organized abuse from religious extremists, paramilitary groups, neo-Nazis, 
extreme nationalists and others, as well as family and community violence, with lesbians 
and transgender women at particular risk.” UN Issues First Report on Human Rights of 
Gay and Lesbian People, UN NEWS CENTRE (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps 
/news/story.asp?NewsID=40743. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon followed this up 
in March 2012 with a call to world leaders to protect gay rights during the U.N.’s first 
hearing on LGBT discrimination and violence. Michelle Garcia, U.N. Secretary-Gen. 
Urges Global Gay Rights, ADVOCATE.COM (Mar. 7, 2012, 5:17 PM), http://www.advocate 
.com/News/Daily_News/2012/03/07/UN_Secretary_Gen_Urges_Global_Gay_Rights/. 
2 May 27 was chosen specifically because it is the anniversary of the decriminalization 
of homosexuality in Russia. See Alekseyev v. Russia, Nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 
14599/09, ¶ 6 (2010). Boris Yeltsin signed a bill repealing Article 121.1 of the Russian 
Criminal Code, which criminalized consensual sex acts between men, on April 29, 1993.  
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of Moscow began an informal campaign to prevent the parade and 
spread the idea that gay activists were provoking societal 
confrontations by promoting homosexuality. On February 16, the 
mayor’s press secretary published a statement that the Moscow 
government would “not even consider allowing the gay parade to be 
held.”3 Less than a week later, on February 22, the mayor himself, 
Yuri Luzhkov, was quoted by the news agency Interfax as saying he 
personally considered homosexuality to be “unnatural,” and that he 
would impose a ban on gay pride parades and rallies to avoid 
“stir[ring] up society.”4 
On March 17, deputy mayor Liudmila Shvetsova, wrote to Mayor 
Luzhkov about the plans to hold the gay pride parade in Moscow.5 
She informed him that the parade was, in her opinion, a threat to the 
health and morals of the people of Moscow, and cited a number of 
petitioners who protested open expressions of support of 
homosexuality.6 However, Shvetsova acknowledged that under 
Russian law—specifically the Federal Law on Assemblies, Meetings, 
Demonstrations, Marches and Picketing (the Assemblies Act)—it was 
not possible to ban the event.7 She suggested that authorities ask to 
change the time or venue of the planned event, or use the possibility 
of the event becoming a public threat to stop it, and requested that the 
 
LAURIE ESSIG, QUEER IN RUSSIA 13 (2009). Lesbian sex was not criminalized in the old 
criminal code; the new code only mentions homosexuality in relation to gay/lesbian rape, 
and the penalties are the same for “gay” rape as for “straight” rape. Immigration and 
Refugee Board of Canada, Russia: Update to RUS13194 of 16 Feb. 1993 on the Treatment 
of Homosexuals (Feb. 29, 2000), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae 
6ad788c.html. 
3 Alekseyev ¶ 7. The press secretary went on to say that Moscow’s government “will not 
allow a gay parade to be held in any form, whether openly or disguised [as a human rights 
demonstration], and any attempt to hold any unauthorised action will be severely 
repressed.” Id. 
4 Id. ¶ 8. 
5 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRIDE AND VIOLENCE: A CHRONICLE OF THE EVENTS OF 
MAY 27, 2006 IN MOSCOW 3 (2006) [hereinafter PRIDE AND VIOLENCE]. 
6 Alekseyev ¶ 9. Shvetsova stated in the memorandum that the planned event was 
“direct propaganda for immorality, insulting the honor and dignity of the overwhelming 
majority of Muscovites and inhabitants of Russia . . . [and] undermining the moral 
principles of the society.” PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 3. 
7 Alekseyev ¶ 9. In spite of her acknowledgement that the Assemblies Act could not 
prevent the rally as planned, and that homosexuality was in fact no longer a crime in the 
Russian Federation, Shvetsova stated that “propaganda in favor of [homosexuality and 
lesbianism], in particular by means of holding gay festivals and gay parades, can be 
considered propaganda for immorality, which may be forbidden by legislation in [the] 
future.” PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 3. 
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mayor agree to develop an action plan to prevent any public or private 
actions towards organizing, promoting, or holding a gay pride event.8 
Following this letter, the mayor issued instructions to local officials 
and prefects to “take concrete measures to prevent holding public and 
mass gay events in the capital,” including organizing a media 
campaign that would draw on objections from local citizens, religious 
leaders, and public organizations.9 In spite of the Moscow 
government’s machinations, Alekseyev and Gay Russia pushed 
forward with their plans to hold the rally. On May 15, the organizers 
submitted notice of the march, including the proposed date, time, and 
route, to the mayor.10 Despite the work of the organizers to ensure 
that local laws were followed when planning the march, the mayor 
refused permission to hold the rally on May 18, citing public safety 
grounds, specifically the “prevention of riots and protection of health, 
morals and the rights and freedoms of others.”11 In the mayor’s 
opinion, the negative reaction of the community to homosexuality in 
general meant that the march “was therefore likely to cause a negative 
reaction and protests against the participants, which could turn into 
civil disorder and mass riots.”12 
In response to the mayor’s refusal to allow them to demonstrate, 
the organizers submitted notice of a second protest, a picket of the 
decision to be held at Lubyanskaya Square, at the same date and time 
as the original march they planned. The next day, May 19, the 
organizers formally challenged the mayor’s decision in the Tverskoi 
District Court.13 Four days later, on May 23, the deputy prefect of the 
Moscow Central Administrative Circuit issued a refusal for the 
 
8 Alekseyev ¶ 9. 
9 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 2. 
10 In order to ensure compliance with local laws, organizers “undertook to cooperate 
with the law-enforcement authorities in ensuring safety and respect for public order by the 
participants and to comply with regulations on restriction of noise levels.” Alekseyev ¶ 11. 
11 Id. ¶ 12. Ironically, on the same day that the mayor issued his decision, Russia 
assumed the six-month chairmanship of the Council of Europe, “the continent’s principle 
body concerned with human rights.” PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 2. Despite a 
pledge by Russia’s foreign minister, Serey Lavrov, that Russia’s tenure as chair would be 
“devoted to openness,” the NGO Human Rights Watch found a “centralized campaign in 
the [Moscow] mayor’s office against any attempts to publicly show support” for Russia’s 
LGBT community. Id. As with Shvetsova’s March 17 letter, the objections to the rally by 
Russian citizens and religious groups were cited as a reason for the rejection. 
12 Alekseyev ¶ 12. In defense of his decision, Mayor Luzhkov cited “numerous petitions 
. . . by representatives of legislative and executive State bodies, religious denominations, 
Cossack elders and other individuals.” Id. 
13 Id. ¶ 14; PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 4. 
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organizers’ second requested rally, the Lubyanskaya picket.14 The 
rationale behind the second decision was the same as the first—a 
gathering of gay activists to promote LGBT rights was a threat to the 
public order of Moscow. 
On May 25, the mayor again voiced his disapproval of both 
homosexuality and the efforts of gay activists to publicly promote gay 
rights, saying that people with sexual “deviations” should not publicly 
demonstrate and that Muscovites agreed with him: “I thank the 
citizens of Moscow as 99.9% of them in recent days also believe it is 
unacceptable to hold such parades.”15 The Moscow Pride Festival 
opened that same day, hosting both domestic and foreign participants 
in a two-day event of lectures and discussions leading up to the 
planned May 27 march. Activists and political figures came from 
around the world to participate, including the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Austria, France, the United States, Poland, Latvia, 
Moldova, and Belarus.16 The first event of the festival was a lecture 
by Merlin Holland, Oscar Wilde’s grandson. During Holland’s 
lecture, over a dozen people stood and began shouting “Russia free of 
faggots!” before spraying the audience with mace.17 
The following day, May 26, saw a couple of significant events. 
First, the mayor’s opposition to both homosexuality and public 
expressions of gay rights was again quoted by Interfax, reiterating his 
firm opposition to allowing a gay pride parade to happen, and 
highlighting the objections of religious groups.18 More importantly, 
the Tverskoi District Court dismissed the complaint filed by 
Alekseyev and Gay Russia. In its rejection of the complaint, the court 
relied upon provisions in the Assemblies Act that addressed the 
responsibility of authorities to ensure the safety of planned events.19 
 
14 Alekseyev ¶ 15. 
15 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 3. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 4. 
18 The mayor was quoted as saying that no gay pride parade would happen as long as he 
was mayor. He went on to say that all three “major” faiths—Christianity (specifically the 
Russian Orthodox Church), Judaism, and Islam—opposed the events, which were 
unacceptable in Russia (unlike some “progressive” Western countries). Alekseyev ¶ 16. 
Interfax also quoted the mayor as saying: “That’s the way morals work. If somebody 
deviates from the normal principles [in accordance with which] sexual and gender life is 
organised, this should not be demonstrated in public and anyone potentially unstable 
should not be invited.” Id. 
19 The court did acknowledge that the Assemblies Act permitted holding the planned 
rally, provided that administrative notice requirements were met, and prohibited the 
interference of organizers, authorities, or other individuals, with the free expression of  
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The court concluded that, under the Assemblies Act, Moscow 
officials’ refusal to allow the event had legitimate grounds; that the 
onus was on the organizers to propose time, date, and venue changes; 
and that the organizers’ right to hold public events had not been 
violated.20 Alekseyev appealed the Tverskoi court’s decision on the 
grounds that Article 12 of the Assemblies Act actually required 
officials, not organizers, to propose time, date, and venue changes for 
events. He also challenged the court’s conclusion that the ban was 
justified on public safety grounds, arguing that any safety concerns 
could have been alleviated by providing police protection for 
participants in the event.21 
In addition to the appeal, Alekseyev and other organizers decided 
to hold two events on May 27. The first was a march to place flowers 
at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Aleksandrovskiy Garden at 
the Kremlin, in a bid to “express[] . . . opposition to nationalism and 
extremism.”22 The second planned event was a vigil in front of a 
statue of Yuri Dolgoruky outside of City Hall to protest the mayor’s 
ban.23 At 2:30 p.m. on the 27th, Alekseyev and other organizers and 
attendants of the festival, totaling approximately fifteen people,24 
approached the gate to the Tomb and were met by approximately two 
to three hundred protestors, including “younger and older Orthodox 
and nationalist counter-protestors, and contingents of elderly women 
carrying crosses and icons.”25 There was a police presence at the 
Tomb, an estimated one hundred and fifty members of the special riot 
squad OMON (Otriad Militsii Osobogo Naznacheniy), but they only 
intervened to arrest Alekseyev for breaching the conditions for 
holding a public demonstration.26 The protestors beat some of the 
 
participants unless they contravened the parameters of the planned event or breached 
public order. Id. ¶ 17. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. ¶ 18. 
22 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 4. 
23 Id.; see also Alekseyev ¶ 19. 
24 Alekseyev ¶ 20. 
25 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
26 Id. at 5; see also Alekseyev ¶ 21. Alekseyev recounted the events to Human Rights 
Watch: 
I saw a huge group of people gathered there, shouting “death to sodomites,” “out of 
Russia,” “we will not allow you to put things here, our grandfathers died fighting 
against people like you.” I said, “My grandfather died fighting against your kind.” I 
said to myself, I will not stop—I will go on. But the gate was closed. Then the 
police suddenly appeared out of nowhere. They began pushing all of us back from 
the gate. Then . . . several officers[] seized me from behind and started to shove me  
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participants while OMON detained the others; a number of protestors 
threw objects at the activists, including eggs, bottles, and rocks.27 
After the small group of LGBT activists withdrew from the Tomb 
to move towards the site of the second planned event, anti-gay 
protestors continued to battle both bystanders and police. Police 
arrested between twenty-five and fifty demonstrators, but the “vast 
majority . . . who had been engaged in violence remained at large.”28 
These protestors made their way towards the site of the planned 
picket, continuing to assault people they perceived to be gay rights 
supporters on the streets along the way. When the remaining gay 
activists arrived at City Hall, a large contingent of anti-gay 
demonstrators was already waiting for them, in addition to the violent 
group of protestors who were still chasing after them from the 
Tomb.29 Amongst the protestors waiting at City Hall was Nikolai 
Kurianovich, a member of the Duma from the right-wing Liberal 
Democratic Party. Kurianovich stood upon the steps of the statue the 
gay rights activists planned their vigil around and warned the crowd 
that “Russia would become like ‘putrid America and dying Europe’ if 
it permitted the ‘gay mafia’ to triumph, and led the crowd in chanting 
‘Gays and lesbians to Kolyma’—the Stalin-era prison camp.”30 Local 
police were again present, but only to arrest gay rights activists, rather 
than the rabidly anti-gay crowd that surrounded them.31 
 
from the square and through the crowd. They pushed me very violently through the 
square and put me in the [police] bus. 
PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 5. British activist Peter Tatchell, who had been a 
participant in the Pride Festival and march to the Tomb, said of the violence they 
encountered: “We were immediately set upon by about 100 fascist thugs and religious 
fanatics who began pushing, punching and kicking us.” Rex Wockner, Pride Moscow, 
INT’L LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS AND INTERSEX ASS’N (ILGA) (May 29, 2006), 
http://ilga.org/ilga/en/article/812. 
27 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 5. 
28 Id.; see also Wockner, supra note 26. 
29 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 6; Alekseyev ¶ 22. 
30 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 6. 
31 Id. One of the remaining organizers, Dimitri Makarov, approached a colonel with the 
police to ask for protection against the extremists, only to be arrested: 
I showed him our application [to hold the demonstration], said this was a 
manifestation within the law. I asked him to defend the picketers against the 
extremists who controlled the square. He pointed to us and said to the officers, 
“Arrest them. Take them to the bus.” He said we had organized an unsanctioned 
demonstration! . . . I pointed out the demonstration of the nationalists that was 
already going on: I said, that is illegal, shouldn’t you stop that? The officers said, 
“We can’t, there is a deputy leading it.” I said, “What about the people standing 
there listening to him?” They said, “Well, they are listening to a deputy.” 
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During the fracas, several LGBT activists arrived and unfurled 
large rainbow flags in front of the statue, including an openly gay 
member of the German Bundestag, Volker Beck.32 The crowd 
immediately reacted with violence: skinheads surrounded the activists 
and ripped the flags away from them. A representative of Human 
Rights Watch was shoved to the ground. Beck and his partner were 
struck in the face with rocks and fists. Police intervened, but “instead 
of trying to separate the two groups they encircled all of them, 
crushing them tightly together and forming a close cordon within 
which the violence continued.”33 A number of arrests were made, 
including both the violent counter-protestors and the non-violent 
LGBT demonstrators. A leader of Russia’s lesbian movement, 
Yevgenia Debrianskaia, was arrested while speaking to journalists 
about the violence. As she told Human Rights Watch: 
I was appalled. I saw an unsanctioned demonstration, headed by a 
Duma parliamentarian, who was calling for gay people to be killed, 
and no one was disturbing him or interfering. . . . The journalists . . . 
turned their cameras to me. . . . I said, I came to exercise my civic 
responsibility, about the unfair ban on gay people. . . . The 
extremists started to throw things at me, rocks and bottles and soda. 
A policeman with three big stars on his shoulder broke through the 
journalists and told me my actions were illegal and I was under 
arrest.34 
Beck was also arrested, along with his partner; he later told the news 
agency Deutsche Presse Agentur that the security forces had not 
protected them, but prevented them from escaping the violence: “We 
were left without any protection.”35 
Reflecting on the event, activist Peter Tatchell placed a large part 
of the blame on Mayor Luzhkov, saying his “homophobia created the 
atmosphere which gave a green light to the fascists to attack the 
Moscow pride participants.”36 Throughout the day a number of people 
 
Id. 
32 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 6–7. 
33 Id. at 7. 
34 Id. 
35 Wockner, supra note 26. When the police realized who Beck was, they immediately 
released him and his partner, telling the men “they had only detained us for our own 
security!” PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 7. 
36 Wockner, supra note 26. In the aftermath of the violence, the director of Human 
Rights Watch’s LGBT Rights Program, Scott Long, also pinpointed Moscow officials as 
the catalyst of the violence: “The authorities in Moscow have endorsed discrimination and 
fostered an environment that allowed hatred to rise . . . . Instead of leading Muscovites to 
embrace equality, Mayor Luzhkov supported and promoted homophobia. Given this 
failure of leadership, the violent ending should surprise no one.” Russia: Investigate  
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were beaten, detained, arrested, and harassed by anti-gay 
demonstrators and police. Skinheads roamed the streets, tracking 
down any remaining gay activists (or people they thought to be 
supporters) to continue the violence and harassment, largely 
unchecked by police.37 While it is unknown exactly how many arrests 
were made in connection with the events of May 27, Human Rights 
Watch was able to identify at least six LGBT supporters who were 
arrested, including organizers Alekseyev, Dmitri Makarov, and 
Alexei Kozlov, who were charged with organizing unsanctioned 
demonstrations.38 Makarov has stated that he was also harassed by 
police at the station: “They threatened me too, saying . . . ‘[w]e’ll beat 
you with the legal code till you realize what an unsanctioned 
demonstration is.’”39 
Following the violence of May 27, Alekseyev and Gay Russia 
attempted to get the Russian court system to recognize their right to 
have their public assemblies sanctioned by local governments. 
Multiple court challenges were filed, and activists waited as their 
cases slowly worked through the Russian judicial system, hitting 
roadblock after roadblock, only to have the courts sustain the bans.40 
 
Attacks on Gay Pride March, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 2, 2006), http://www.hrw.org 
/news/2006/06/01/russia-investigate-attacks-gay-pride-march. 
37 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 9. One French participant who was seriously 
injured, Pierre Serne, told Human Rights Watch about the difficulty in finding safe haven 
or help that day: 
I was asking people on the streets to help me, asking where the police were. People 
avoided me. And when some skinheads saw that no one was doing anything, they 
started to follow me again. I saw two Russian photographers who were covering the 
event. I asked them to call the police. But the skinheads started chasing all three of 
us, mainly, though, after me. They began hitting me again. Then the police arrived, 
at last. . . . They arrested five of [the skinheads]. Then they took me to the bus. I 
was put in with the skinheads. . . . Those guys were just laughing in the bus, like the 
others on the street, as if they knew they had no fear of anything. 
Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 10. 
40 On June 16, Alekseyev and Gay Russia decided to file another court challenge to the 
city’s prohibition of the City Hall picket. Five weeks later, on August 22, the Taganskiy 
District Court of Moscow dismissed the challenge on the grounds that public safety 
concerns justified the ban; Alekseyev immediately appealed. Alekseyev v. Russia, Nos. 
4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09, ¶ 25 (2010). The Moscow City Court finally reviewed 
the pending appeal of the Tverskoi District Court’s May 26 decision upholding the ban on 
September 19; it found no fault with the lower court’s decision and upheld it as “justified 
in the circumstances.” Id. ¶ 26. Over two months passed before it reviewed the appeal of 
the Taganskiy District Court’s August 22 ruling, and it found no fault in that decision 
either. Id. ¶ 27. 
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The years since 2006 have seen similar attempts to organize pride 
rallies, and similar obstacles set up by the city to prevent them. In 
both 2007 and 2008, organizers submitted multiple requests and plans 
for a variety of gay pride events; every single request was rejected, 
ostensibly on the grounds of public safety.41 After three years of being 
prevented from obtaining relief by domestic courts, Alekseyev filed 
an application with the European Court of Human Rights, claiming 
violations of his rights under the European Convention. Every ruling 
the domestic courts had given subverted the constitutional rights of 
Alekseyev and other LGBT Russians, and, as the European Court of 
Human Rights would eventually rule, their human right to freely 
assemble without being subjected to discriminatory restrictions. 
II 
RELEVANT LAW 
A. Domestic Laws 
There are dual levels of domestic law at play in Alekseyev. The first 
is the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which guarantees 
Russians freedom of association and the right to peaceful assembly. 
Article 30 contains the right to association.42 Article 31 guarantees the 
right to peaceful assembly.43 Article 55(3) provides for those 
freedoms to be restricted by federal laws under certain circumstances, 
such as the protection of public morals and the rights of others.44 
 
41 In 2007, Alekseyev and others attempted to organize a march similar to the one they 
had attempted in the previous year. The march and a picket (similar to the 2006 picket) 
were banned on the grounds of “public order, prevention of riots and protection of health, 
morals and the rights and freedoms of others.” Alekseyev ¶ 32. On May 27, after 
attempting to march to the mayor’s office to file petitions protesting the bans, a small 
number of activists, including Alekseyev, were detained for twenty-four hours for 
disobeying a lawful order. Both the District and City Courts upheld the city’s decisions, 
finding public safety concerns justified the bans. Id. ¶¶ 37–38. In 2008, organizers were 
particularly careful about complying with the city’s laws but still received denials of every 
one of their twenty-five requests. Id. ¶¶ 40–44. As in previous years, court challenges were 
filed in District and City Courts, but the government won each challenge. Id. ¶ 46. 
42 See CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, art. 30(1) (“Everyone shall have 
the right to association, including the right to create trade unions for the protection of his 
or her interests. The freedom of activity of public association shall be guaranteed.”). 
43 Id. at art. 31 (“Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to assemble 
peacefully, without weapons, hold rallies, meetings and demonstrations, marches and 
pickets.”). 
44 Alekseyev ¶ 49. See also CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, art. 55(3) 
(“The rights and freedoms of man and citizen may be limited by the federal law only to 
such an extent to which it is necessary for the protection of the fundamental principles of  
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The other level of domestic law is the Assemblies Act, which local 
officials used to justify the bans. The Assemblies Act was created 
with the aim of “ensuring realization of the constitutionally mandated 
right of citizens of the Russian Federation to peaceful assembly 
without weapons, to hold rallies, meetings, demonstrations, marches 
and picketing.”45 The Act gives the organizer of a public event the 
right to hold public demonstrations—including marches—provided 
the organizer meets certain requirements.46 Article 12 of the 
Assemblies Act governs the responsibilities of the executive 
authority. There is no provision in this section granting the 
government authority to outright ban a public event as long as the 
aforementioned requirements have been met. Officials are limited to 
proposing alternate venues, appointing a representative to assist 
organizers of the event, and taking on various tasks that help promote 
and maintain public order.47 Article 18 actually prohibits executive 
interference in the rights of the participants except in certain 
circumstances: “The promoter of a public event, officials and other 
citizens shall have no right to prevent participants in the public event 
from expressing their opinion in a manner not violating the public 
order and rules of procedure for holding the public event.”48 
B. International Laws 
Two aspects of international human rights law are necessary to 
understanding this case. The first is the widely recognized right to 
free assembly, the primary claim of Alekseyev before the European 
Court.49 The right to assemble is guaranteed by multiple international 
 
the constitutional system, morality, health, the rights and lawful interests of other people, 
for ensuring defence of the country and security of the State.”). 
45 Federal Law No. 54-FZ on Rallies, Meetings, Demonstrations, Marches and 
Picketing, June 19, 2004, available at http://legislationline.org/documents/action/popup 
/id/4367 [hereinafter Assemblies Act]. 
46 Assemblies Act at art. 5(3)(1). These requirements include notifying the executive 
authority of the planned event; notifying the authority of changes to the event within a 
specified period of time; ensuring compliance with any conditions for holding the event; 
ensuring that participants in the event maintain public order; and ensuring, to the extent 
possible, public order and the safety of citizens during the event. Id. at art. 5(4)(i)–(v). 
47 Id. at art. 12(1)(i)–(vii). 
48 Id. at art. 18(1). 
49 Three articles of the European Convention were at question in Alekseyev: (1) 
freedom of assembly and association, Article 11; (2) the right to an effective remedy, 
Article 13; and (3) the prohibition of discrimination, Article 14. Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005 
[hereinafter European Convention]. The primary violation that Alekseyev sought relief for  
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instruments, most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), the European Convention, and the International Covenant 
for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).50 The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) also guarantees the 
freedom of peaceful assembly and association. The second aspect is 
the stance of the international legal community on discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. A number of international instruments 
address both the importance of the right to free assembly and the 
pernicious effects of sexual orientation discrimination. State 
discrimination against sexual minorities has been studied, discussed, 
and generally condemned by the Committee of Ministers, the Council 
of Europe, and the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights; it has also 
been recognized by both the European Court of Human Rights and 
the European Court of Justice as a generally impermissible form of 
discrimination. 
1. Freedom of Assembly 
Aside from the UDHR and the European Convention, the ICCPR, 
to which Russia is a party, also contains the right of peaceful 
assembly: 
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions 
may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed 
in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public safety, public 
order . . . the protection of public health or morals or the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.51 
The EU Charter, which is the “first formal EU document to combine 
and declare all the values and fundamental rights . . . to which EU 
citizens should be entitled,” also contains a guarantee of the freedom 
 
was the Article 11 right. The Article 13 claim was a result of the ineffectiveness of the 
Russian judicial system in respect to adjudicating the applicant’s claim in a timely manner. 
Article 14 is considered a “parasitic” right—finding an Article 14 violation is contingent 
upon finding violations of another article. See generally Rory O’Connell, Cinderella 
Comes to the Ball: Article 14 and the Right to Non-Discrimination in the ECHR, 29 
LEGAL STUD. 211, 212 (2009). 
50 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 20(i), U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (“Everyone has the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and association.”); European Convention, supra note 49, at 
art. 11; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 21, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
51 ICCPR, supra note 50, at art. 21. Russia signed the treaty on March 18, 1968, and 
ratified it on October 16, 1973. See Status of the ICCPR, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter 
=4&lang=en (last updated Jan. 28, 2012). 
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of assembly and association.52 Article 12 of the Charter states: 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to 
freedom of association at all levels, in particular in political, trade 
union and civic matters.”53 
Regardless of a wide recognition of the freedom of assembly, this 
right is not without limitations. Legitimate aims for restricting 
freedom of assembly can include national security; public safety; 
prevention of disorder or crime; protection of health or morals; and 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.54 However, under the 
European Convention, “restrictions should be (1) prescribed by law, 
(2) have a legitimate aim, and (3) be necessary in a democratic 
society to achieve those aims.”55 The Court applies this three-part test 
after confirming that public authorities did in fact interfere with the 
rights in question. 
In addition to the three-part test employed to determine if a 
restriction on assembly is legitimate, the Court has set some limits on 
what constitutes a legitimate aim.56 Governments have an obligation 
to not only allow assemblies whose viewpoints they disagree with, 
but also an obligation to protect the people participating in those 
assemblies from violence.57 The Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) produced guidelines for 
states on how to guarantee and execute effective rights of free 
assembly, recognizing that “[t]he freedom of peaceful assembly can 
be an important strand in the maintenance and development of 
 
52 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, EU CHARTER, www.eucharter.org (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2012). The EU Charter became a binding part of EU Law when the Treaty of 
Lisbon came into force in December of 2009. 
53 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 12(1), 2000 O.J. (C 364) 
1 (Dec. 18, 2000) [hereinafter EU Charter]. Article 12(1) corresponds to Article 11 in the 
European Convention. See European Convention, supra note 49, at art. 11. 
54 COUNCIL OF EUROPE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DISCRIMINATION ON 
GROUNDS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY IN EUROPE 72 (2d ed. 2011), 
available at http://www.coe.int/t/Commissioner/Source/LGBT/LGBTStudy2011_en.pdf 
[hereinafter SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN EUROPE]. 
55 Id. 
56 For example, the “morality” exception does not give a state free hand to quell any 
public assembly it deems immoral. Authorities are still obligated to respect the right of 
assembly for people whose opinions or lifestyles they may find controversial or 
unwelcome. 
57 SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN EUROPE, supra note 54, at 72–73. 
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culture, and in the preservation of minority identities.”58 It extends the 
definition of “peaceful” assemblies to include those that “may annoy 
or give offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that a 
particular assembly is promoting,” a defense particular to states 
attempting to justify restrictions on LGBT rights to assembly.59 
2. Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
Sexual orientation discrimination has recently become a cause of 
concern amongst many international bodies, especially within the 
European community. The Council of Europe—which consists of the 
Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly, the 
Commissioner for Human Rights, and the European Court of Human 
Rights—has been “extensively involved” in advocating for and 
protecting the right of assembly for LGBT persons.60 In one notable 
example, Thomas Hammarberg, the Commissioner for Human Rights 
for the Council of Europe, issued a statement in response to the 
Moscow ban on May 26, 2006, the day before the riots. He classified 
the right to peaceful assembly as a “fundamental right[] in a 
democratic society [that] belong[s] to all people, not just the majority. 
A demonstration may annoy or give offence to persons opposed to the 
ideas or claims expressed, but this cannot be a reason to ban a 
peaceful gathering.”61 
In 2010, the Committee of Ministers issued Recommendation 
CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity (Recommendation on 
Discrimination). Section III explicitly addresses freedom of 
expression and peaceful assembly in the context of sexual orientation 
discrimination: “Member states should take appropriate measures at 
national, regional and local levels to ensure that the right to freedom 
of peaceful assembly, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Convention, 
can be effectively enjoyed, without discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation or gender identity.”62 Article 15 calls upon member 
 
58 OSCE/ODIHR PANEL OF EXPERTS ON THE FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY, GUIDELINES 
ON FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY 13 (2007) [hereinafter ODIHR GUIDELINES]. 
59 Id. 
60 Ronald Holzhacker, State-Sponsored Homophobia and the Denial of the Right of 
Assembly in Europe 19 (unpublished panel paper for the American Political Science 
Association, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1643314. 
61 Statement, Thomas Hammarberg, Freedom of Assembly Belongs to All People (May 
26, 2006), available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1010053&Site=COE. 
62 Council of Europe Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on 
Measures to Combat Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity  
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states to ensure that law enforcement protects peaceful gay rights 
demonstrators from any attempts to interrupt the free exercise of their 
right to assembly, and Article 16 asks member states to ensure that 
administrative and legal procedures are not used to ban peaceful 
LGBT assemblies.63 The recommendation even goes so far as to ask 
public officials to use media to publicly condemn attempts to interfere 
with the lawful expression of the right to assemble by gay rights 
supporters.64 
In addition to the Recommendation on Discrimination, the 
Parliamentary Assembly has also passed a resolution on sexual 
orientation and gender identity discrimination. Resolution 1728 
reaffirms that “[s]exual orientation and gender identity are recognised 
as prohibited grounds for discrimination.”65 The Resolution, in 
addition to clarifying both the Council of Europe’s and the Court’s 
positions on sexual orientation discrimination, specifically addresses 
freedom of assembly and LGBT rights. Section six states that “[t]he 
Assembly is particularly concerned by the violation of the rights to 
freedom of assembly and freedom of expression for LGBT persons in 
a number of Council of Europe member states since these rights are 
pillars of democracy.”66 Bans and attempted bans on gay rights 
demonstrations are illustrative of why the Parliamentary Assembly is 
concerned, and this is reiterated in Section 16.1.67 The Resolution is 
also critical of the “overt or tacit support some politicians have given 
 
§ III(14), 1081st Mtg. of the Ministers’ Deputies (Mar. 31, 2010), available at https://wcd 
.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1606669 [hereinafter Recommendation on Discrimination]. 
63 Id. § III, arts. 15–16. Article 15 reads as follows: 
Member states should ensure that law enforcement authorities take appropriate 
measures to protect participants in peaceful demonstrations in favour of the human 
rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons from any attempts to 
unlawfully disrupt or inhibit the effective enjoyment of their right to freedom of 
expression and peaceful assembly. 
Article 16 seems almost tailored as a response to Moscow’s approach to banning pride 
parades: “Member states should take appropriate measures to prevent restrictions on the 
effective enjoyment of the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly resulting 
from the abuse of legal or administrative provisions, for example on grounds of public 
health, public morality and public order.” Id. § III, art. 16 (emphasis added). 
64 Id. at art. 17. 
65 Parliamentary Assembly, Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity, Resolution 1728 § 2, 17th Sitting (Apr. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Resolution 
1728]. 
66 Id. § 6. 
67 Id. § 16.1 (calling on member states to “ensure that the fundamental rights of LGBT 
people, including freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association, are 
respected, in line with international human rights standards”). 
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to violent counter-demonstrations,” the potency of which was 
demonstrated in Moscow by the actions of Mayor Luzhkov and the 
Duma member Kurianovich.68 
There are some notable non-legal instruments that are taken into 
consideration by the Court and other international human rights 
bodies when deciding cases on sexual orientation discrimination. One 
is advice provided by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) 
in a recently published report on sexual orientation discrimination in 
EU member states. In that report, the FRA specifically noted the 
importance of pride events to LGBT persons, finding that “pride 
marches or similar gatherings and events constitute an important 
means through which LGBT persons exercise their right to freedom 
of assembly and freedom of expression.”69 The FRA report highlights 
actions taken by the European Parliament to promote the recognition 
of LGBT rights of assembly,70 and also makes recommendations on 
how local governments can facilitate that recognition. One 
recommendation that is particularly germane to the current case calls 
for eliminating the use of “public order” concerns as an excuse for 
officials to violate those rights.71 
Another non-legal instrument is the Yogyakarta Principles on the 
Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity (Yogyakarta Principles). Drafted in 
2006 by human rights law experts, the Yogyakarta Principles contain 
twenty-nine principles that discuss what rights are protected under 
international law with respect to sexual orientation and gender 
 
68 Id. § 6. 
69 EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, HOMOPHOBIA, 
TRANSPHOBIA AND DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
GENDER IDENTITY IN THE EU MEMBER STATES 17 (2010), available at http://fra.europa 
.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/FRA-homophobia-synthesis-report-2011_EN.pdf. 
70 Id. at 19. The policies highlighted by the FRA are “[v]arious European Parliament 
resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2007” that found bans on Pride marches to 
“contravene the principles protected by the ECHR,” and a 2009 resolution on a Lithuanian 
law called the Protection of Minors Against the Detrimental Effects of Public Information. 
Id. The Lithuanian law contained language that effectively banned information on same-
sex relationships, and the Parliament’s resolution “reaffirm[ed] the importance of the EU 
fighting against all forms of discrimination, including discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.” Id. at 18–19. 
71 Id. (“Arguments regarding the preservation of ‘public order’ should not be used to 
impose undue restrictions on LGBT-related events and other manifestations of LGBT 
identities or relationships. Public authorities should ensure that homophobic counter-
demonstrations do not hinder lawful LGBT events.”). 
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identity.72 Principle 20 contains the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and association, and is defined as follows: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association, including for the purposes of peaceful demonstrations, 
regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity. Persons may 
form and have recognised, without discrimination, associations 
based on sexual orientation or gender identity, and associations that 
distribute information to or about, facilitate communication among, 
or advocate for the rights of, persons of diverse sexual orientations 
and gender identities.73 
In addition to defining the freedom of assembly and association in the 
context of sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination, the 
Yogyakarta Principles detail positive obligations on states to ensure 
that these rights are realized and protected. These duties include 
ensuring that legislative and administrative measures protect LGBT 
rights of assembly, that adequate police protection is provided to 
demonstrators against potentially violent counter-demonstrators, and 
that these rights are not restricted on the grounds of public order, 
public morality, public health, and public security.74 In Alekseyev, the 
Russian government is alleged to have violated every single one of 
these duties. 
III 
LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
A. The Allegations 
The Court considered allegations that three rights of the European 
Convention were violated. Article 11(1), or the right to freedom of 
assembly, states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the 
 
72 David Brown, Making Room for Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in 
International Human Rights Law: An Introduction to the Yogyakarta Principles, 31 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 821, 822, 833 (2010). Signatories to the Principles include notable human 
rights jurists, human rights treaty body members, UN Special Rapporteurs, law professors, 
and human rights activists. Two NGOs also participated: the International Commission of 
Jurists (ICJUR) and the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR). Id. at 840. 
73 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES ON THE APPLICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN RELATION TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
GENDER IDENTITY, Principle 20 (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES]. 
74 Id. at Principle 20, §§ (A)–(E). 
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right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests.”75 Article 11(2) provides for exceptions to this right: 
No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other 
than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful 
restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed 
forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.76 
The Court’s primary question was centered on section two, asking 
whether the ban imposed by Mayor Luzhkov was in accordance with 
the law and “necessary in a democratic society” to protect the 
interests of any of the enumerated reasons. 
In addition to Article 11, the Muscovite government was alleged to 
have violated Article 13, or the right to an effective remedy.77 The 
alleged violation of this article stems from the Russian judicial 
system’s repeated refusal to recognize the claims of the applicant or 
ameliorate the harm of the bans, and from the statutory guidelines that 
made it impossible to receive a final decision on the ban before the 
event’s scheduled date. The Court was then asked to determine if the 
violations of Articles 11 and 13 were motivated by discrimination, 
which would be a violation of Article 14: “The enjoyment of rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”78 
B. Russia’s Arguments 
The Russian government’s argument revolved around three points: 
(1) the bans on the applicant’s public events are lawful; (2) the bans 
pursue legitimate aims; and (3) the bans are necessary in a democratic 
society. To bolster its first claim, the government pointed to the 
domestic legal instruments in question, the Constitution and the 
 
75 European Convention, supra note 49, at art. 11(1). 
76 Id. at art. 11(2). 
77 Id. at art. 13 (“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention 
are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that 
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”). 
78 Id. at art. 14. The phrase “other status” has been interpreted to include a variety of 
grounds for protection, including marital status and sexual orientation. See O’Connoll, 
supra note 49, at 13. 
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Assemblies Act. It argued that the inevitably violent confrontation 
between the activists and counter-demonstrators was a risk to public 
safety, and that these grounds were sufficient to justify banning the 
public event under Article 55 § 3 of the Constitution and Article 8(1) 
of the Assemblies Act.79 The government also claimed to be operating 
within its margin of appreciation under Article 11(2), arguing for 
leeway when it comes to protecting the public during potentially 
volatile public events.80 It claimed that the ban was the only way to 
maintain public order “because no other measure could have 
adequately addressed the security risks.”81 
With respect to its second argument, the government claimed that it 
had three legitimate aims in banning gay pride demonstrations: (1) 
protecting public safety, (2) protecting morals, and (3) protecting the 
rights and freedoms of others.82 Its public safety concerns are well 
documented, though the violence came from the counter-
demonstrators instead of the organizers and their supporters. To 
support its argument that it was acting in protection of morals, the 
 
79 Alekseyev v. Russia, Nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09, ¶ 57 (2010). Article 55 
§ 3 of the Constitution, supra note 49, reads: 
The rights and freedoms of man and citizen may be limited by the federal law only 
to such an extent to which it is necessary for the protection of the fundamental 
principles of the constitutional system, morality, health, the rights and lawful 
interests of other people, for ensuring defence of the country and security of the 
State. 
Article 8(1) of the Assemblies Act reads: “A Public event may be carried out at any place 
suitable for the purposes of the given event provided the holding of such event creates no 
threat of collapse of buildings and structures or any other threat to the security of 
participants in the public event.” 
80 The “margin of appreciation” doctrine is analogous to judicial discretion; it is “based 
on the notion that each society is entitled to certain latitude in balancing individual rights 
and national interests, as well as in resolving conflicts that emerge as a result of diverse 
moral convictions.” Onder Bakircioglu, The Application of the Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine in Freedom of Expression and Public Morality Cases, 8 GERMAN L.J. 711, 711 
(2007). 
81 Alekseyev ¶ 58. The government also claimed that a ruling contrary to its domestic 
courts’ rulings would make the Court a “court of fourth instance.” The Fourth Instance 
Doctrine is meant to maintain a high level of deference to national court systems, and the 
Court will generally only question the rulings of a domestic court “where the interpretation 
by the national court is ‘arbitrary,’ or where it is a part of a Convention requirement that 
national law be complied with . . . . Even so, it is very exceptional for the Court to disagree 
with any decision by a national court on its interpretation and application of its own 
national law.” D.J. HARRIS, M. O’BOYLE, E.P. BATES & C.M. BUCKLEY, LAW OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 15 (2d ed. 2009). 
82 See Paul Johnson, Homosexuality, Freedom of Assembly and the Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights: Alekseyev v. Russia, 11 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 578, 580 (2011). 
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government relied on the religiosity of the Russian people. It argued 
that promotion of homosexuality was “incompatible with the 
‘religious doctrines for the majority of the population.’”83 It supported 
this claim with the statements by local religious leaders and 
organizations condemning pride parades specifically, and 
homosexuality generally.84 Allowing the gay pride parade to go 
forward would be an insult to religious Russians who object to 
homosexuality, the government argued; it would be a “terrible 
debasement of their human dignity.”85 To buttress its religious 
protection claim, the government fell back on the guarantees of 
respect and protection of individual religious and moral beliefs found 
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) and the ICCPR.86 
The government concluded its argument by disputing the idea that 
there was a consensus within the Council of Europe on the extent to 
which homosexuality was accepted in each country, a claim meant to 
 
83 Alekseyev ¶ 59. 
84 These statements came from the Orthodox Church, the Supreme Mufti for Russia, 
and the head of the Muslim authority of Nizhniy Novgorod, and ranged from threatening 
mass protests to calling for the stoning of homosexuals. See Johnson, supra note 82, at 
581. The Orthodox Church protested the parade on the belief that it was sin-promoting 
propaganda. The Supreme Mufti promised that Muslims and other “normal” people would 
protest en masse. And the Muslim authority in Nizhniy Novgorod claimed that, “as a 
matter of necessity, homosexuals must be stoned to death.” Id. 
85 Alekseyev ¶ 59. 
86 See ICCPR, supra note 50, at art. 18(1) (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice and teaching.”). The ICESCR only references religious protection in the context 
of preventing religious discrimination in state fulfillment of its provisions: “The States 
Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the 
present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to . . . religion.” 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), art. 2(2), 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. Reliance on this treaty to prove the point of religious 
discrimination is inapt, as none of the rights enumerated in the ICESCR are alleged to 
have been violated by the presence of a gay pride parade, let alone on religious grounds. 
The Russian government claimed that allowing gay pride parades would “breach the rights 
of those people whose religious and moral beliefs included a negative attitude towards 
homosexuality.” Alekseyev ¶ 60. It argued that “the democratic State must protect society 
from destructive influence on its moral fundamentals, and protect the human dignity of all 
citizens, including believers.” Id. In other words, allowing realization of LGBT Russians’ 
right to freely assemble would trample on the rights of religious Russians to have 
religiously rooted negative views on homosexuality; the Russian government saw itself as 
protecting the bulk of its population from having their religious rights encroached upon by 
a small portion of the population. 
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invoke the margin of appreciation doctrine.87 It first argued for 
keeping expressions of homosexuality or LGBT support purely in the 
private sphere, such as clubs, bars, and entertainment facilities; the 
idea was that homosexuality was something that “involuntary 
spectators” should not be exposed to, especially children.88 The 
government then claimed that because, in its opinion, Muscovites 
were not ready to accept gay pride parades or other public 
demonstrations of LGBT support, it was the duty of the Moscow 
government to “demonstrate sensitivity to the existing public 
resentment of any overt manifestation of homosexuality.”89 
C. Alekseyev’s Arguments 
Every argument made by the Russian government was strongly 
contested by Alekseyev. There are three basic points that rebut every 
claim made by the government: (1) domestic law does not provide for 
an outright ban on public events, merely for proposed changes in date, 
time, or venue; (2) the government’s so-called “legitimate aims” for 
the bans are inapplicable; and (3) the bans are not necessary in a 
democratic society. The first point is supported by Article 8(1) of the 
Assemblies Act, which governs public events where there are safety 
concerns. There is no language in that section allowing officials to 
ban an event for public safety concerns; rather, they are required to 
suggest another venue.90 Even if the Court had found that the 
 
87 The government wanted to demonstrate that there was a lack of agreement on the 
extent of LGBT rights throughout Europe that justified a wide margin of appreciation from 
the Court. Typically, when dealing with public morals issues, the Court “generally submits 
that Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation, and defers to the national 
authorities’ judgments.” See Bakircioglu, supra note 80, at 717. A lack of a “uniform 
conception of morals provides a legitimate justification for the Court to evade its 
supervisory role.” Id. at 727. 
88 Alekseyev ¶ 61. 
89 Id. ¶ 62. It again referred to the numerous statements from religious groups, civic 
leaders, and Russian celebrities condemning the gay pride parade. 
90 Id. ¶ 64. Article 12(1)(2) states that the governing body, upon receipt of notice of a 
public event, is obligated “to deliver to the promoter of the public event, within three days 
from receipt of the notice . . . a well-motivated proposal to alter the place and/or time of 
holding the public event.” Assemblies Act, art. 12(1)(2). Even if the proposed public event 
has goals that are counter to the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, 
or defy administrative or criminal bans enacted by the government, the Assemblies Act 
only gives the governing body authority to “immediately give to the promoter of the public 
event a motivated caution in writing to the effect that the promoter and also other 
participants in the public event . . . may be held responsible as appropriate.” Assemblies 
Act, art. 12(2). Nothing in the Act provides for an outright ban on public events, regardless 
of their content or the manner in which they are held. 
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Assemblies Act provided for public safety bans, Alekseyev argued, 
the government failed to prove its case on the other two requirements 
in Article 8 § 2 of the European Convention: that the bans pursue 
legitimate aims and are necessary in a democratic society. 
Alekseyev rejected all three legitimate aims put forward by the 
government to justify the bans. The first, public morals, was rejected 
because “the Government’s definition of ‘morals’ included only 
attitudes that were dominant in public opinion and did not encompass 
the notions of diversity and pluralism.”91 Additional arguments 
pointed out that the proposed activities were actually demonstrations 
in favor of civil liberties—a goal hardly considered morally 
objectionable by most—and that no “immoral” behavior, such as 
nudity or public sexual activity, had been planned for any of the 
events. The Court noted that the Russian government had not shown 
that any concrete harm to persons or society would result from the 
gay pride rallies. Alekseyev argued that, contrary to this notion of 
societal harm, “the events would have been of benefit to Russian 
society by advocating the ideas of tolerance and respect for the rights 
of the lesbian and gay population.”92 
In response to the government’s purported aim of protecting public 
safety and preventing disorder, Alekseyev pointed out that every 
planned march was intended to be peaceful. The government’s 
resistance rested on the assumptions of violence from counter-
demonstrators. However, the Court noted that the government never 
assessed the scale of potential violence between demonstrators and 
counter-demonstrators, which undermined the government’s claim 
that it was unable to provide adequate security for the events.93 While 
the Court does not mention any arguments made by Alekseyev to 
counter the government position that the protection of religious 
freedoms of a majority of its population was a legitimate aim for the 
ban, it does address this claim in its assessment of the case.94 
Finally, Alekseyev disputed the claim that the bans are necessary in 
a democratic society by referencing the Court’s established case law. 
Referring to the 2007 decision in Bączkowski v. Poland, the landmark 
case which found that administrative roadblocks that effectively ban 
gay pride parades can constitute Article 11 violations, the applicant 
 
91 Alekseyev ¶ 65. 
92 Id. (emphasis added). 
93 Id. ¶ 66. The government never submitted reasons why security was not possible at 
any of the rejected venues in the three years that the Court examined (2006–2008). 
94 For discussion on this point, see infra p. 124 and notes 99–100. 
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argued that “the mere possibility of confusing and even shocking part 
of society could not be regarded as a sufficient ground for such a 
sweeping measure as a total ban” on gay pride events.95 Alekseyev 
argued that the values of a democratic society include pluralism, 
tolerance, and broadmindedness, and that bans on gay pride events 
like the ones in question are incompatible with these democratic 
characteristics. In his mind, the government not only discouraged 
participation in a process necessary to a democratic society (freedom 
of assembly), but had also encouraged the negative attitudes 
expressed by counter-demonstrators that the event organizers and 
their goals were immoral. This had the effect of “depriving the 
minority of a lawful right to hold a peaceful demonstration, a right 
that was inherent in a society striving to be democratic.”96 This 
disapproval, and the concurrent violation of democratic aims, led to 
the government’s prohibition on what was essentially a lawful 
demonstration, and to its failure to protect the participants. 
IV 
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 
The Court immediately noted in its rationale that there is “no 
doubt” that the applicant’s Article 11 rights were interfered with by 
the Russian government; this point was actually conceded by both 
parties. The question the Court was considering was whether or not 
the bans were justified. It wasted no time in finding that there was no 
legitimate justification for the bans enacted by Moscow; 
consequently, the Court easily found that the Russian government had 
committed an unjustified Article 11 violation in banning the pride 
events. Referring back to its decision in Bączkowski, it noted that “the 
only necessity capable of justifying an interference with any of the 
rights enshrined in those Articles is one that may claim to spring from 
a ‘democratic society.’”97 The Court has found in the past that the 
hallmarks of a democratic society, as argued by Alekseyev, are 
pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness.98 In the course of 
pursuing these aims, the Court has allowed the interests of individuals 
 
95 Alekseyev ¶ 67; see also Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, No. 1543/06, ¶ 64 (2007). 
96 Alekseyev ¶ 67. 
97 Bączkowski ¶ 61 (citations omitted). 
98 Id. ¶ 63. The Court put particular emphasis on pluralism, noting: “pluralism is . . . 
built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity. . . . The harmonious interaction 
of persons and groups with varied identities is essential for achieving social cohesion.” Id. 
¶ 62 (citations omitted). 
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to be subordinated by those of a group: “[D]emocracy does not 
simply mean that the views of the majority must always prevail: a 
balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment 
of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.”99 
A. Public Safety 
The Court then turned to the first of the three “legitimate aims” the 
Russian government claimed, public safety. A large part of the 
government’s evidence to defend this argument rested on the petitions 
presented from those religious and civil organizations that objected to 
the planned pride events.100 In response to this argument, the Court 
referred to its previous case law, noting that Article 11 protects any 
public event that “may annoy or cause offence to persons opposed to 
the ideas or claims that it is seeking to promote.”101 This protection 
imposes an affirmative duty upon governments to take “reasonable 
and appropriate measures to enable lawful demonstrations to proceed 
peacefully.”102 The Court found that the government failed in this 
duty, and that the petitions it presented in support of its public safety 
justification were, at least in part, “irrelevant to safety 
considerations.”103 
Despite this level of discretion, the Court emphasized that the mere 
presence of a risk is insufficient grounds for a ban; the government 
must show assessments of the potential scale of the violence, as well 
as steps taken to mitigate potential violence while still maintaining the 
 
99 Alekseyev ¶ 70 (citations omitted). This appears to be part of a broader argument 
rebutting the Russian government’s position that religious freedom of individuals and 
groups who oppose homosexuality justify the bans. One commentator has noted that the 
implication of this position is that “no matter how dominant a religion is in a society, faith 
should not assume any special status in balancing the protection of the Article 11 rights of 
homosexuals with the rights and freedoms of others.” Johnson, supra note 82, at 589. 
100 The Court pointed out that those petitions were not all of the same ilk. Some merely 
expressed disapproval of the pride events and homosexuality. Others expressed plans to 
demonstrate against the pride parade, and still others explicitly threatened violence if the 
parade was allowed. Alekseyev ¶ 72. 
101 Id. ¶ 73 (citations omitted). 
102 Id. (citations omitted). The first set of petitions presented carried no threats of 
violence or counterdemonstrations, and were thus “irrelevant.” Id. ¶ 74. 
103 Those petitions that carried threats of violence or counter-demonstrations were 
relevant insofar as security arrangements were concerned, an area where governments 
have been given relatively wide latitude. Id. ¶ 75 (“As a general rule, where a serious 
threat of a violent counterdemonstration exists, the Court has a allowed the domestic 
authorities a wide discretion in the choice of means to enable assemblies to take place 
without disturbance.”). 
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rights of its LGBT citizens to demonstrate peacefully.104 In this case, 
the Russian government failed to show any attempts to assess the 
potential violence of counter-demonstrations and create security plans 
to protect the pride parade, opting instead to just ban the event 
outright.105 The Court rejected the government’s argument that the 
violent threats necessitated a ban on the events, noting that if violent 
threats were truly a concern of the Moscow government, it would 
have prosecuted those responsible for making the threats.106 
Furthermore, regardless of the government’s failure to adequately 
assess the risks involved in holding pride events, threats of violence 
should not automatically warrant a complete ban on pride parades: 
“[I]f every probability of tension and heated exchange between 
opposing groups during a demonstration were to warrant its 
prohibition, society would be faced with being deprived of the 
opportunity of hearing differing views on any question which offends 
the sensitivity of the majority opinion.”107 These factors were 
paramount in the Court’s finding that the Russian government’s bans 
were not justified by public safety concerns, but were in fact a 
secondary consideration to the government’s concerns about public 
morals. 
B. Public Morals 
To support its conclusion that the government’s primary concern 
was about public morals, the Court first pointed to the discriminatory 
statements made by government officials, specifically the mayor of 
 
104 Id. 
105 Even if the Muscovite government had done some assessment of the counter-
demonstrations, the Court found that there was only a potential total of about one hundred 
protestors, a number that would hardly overwhelm the security forces of a city the size of 
Moscow. Id. 
106 Again, the Russian government did not make any attempt to take these steps. Id. ¶ 
76. The Court noted that those who threatened violence against the pride participants, 
specifically the Muslim cleric from Nizhniy Novgorod who called for the stoning of 
homosexuals, avoided any culpability: “[I]t does not appear that the authorities in the 
present case reacted to the cleric’s call for violence in any other way than banning the 
event he condemned.” Id. The Court also pointed out that the government’s ban not only 
avoided the issue of violence against LGBT participants, but also encouraged the 
confrontations with those who participated in the pride events: “By relying on such 
blatantly unlawful calls as grounds for the ban, the authorities effectively endorsed the 
intentions of persons and organizations that clearly and deliberately intended to disrupt a 
peaceful demonstration in breach of the law and public order.” Id. 
107 Id. ¶ 77. 
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Moscow.108 In addition to the mayor’s own comments that 
celebrations of gay pride are “inappropriate,” the government argued 
that pride events should be banned on principle, “because propaganda 
promoting homosexuality was incompatible with religious doctrines 
and the moral values of the majority, and could be harmful if seen by 
children or vulnerable adults.”109 The government’s objection on 
morality grounds was, in the Court’s opinion, insufficient grounds for 
banning the events under public law, and was clearly disproportionate 
to either of the aims put forward by Russia.110 
The Court reiterated the importance of freedom of peaceful 
assembly to promoting democratic principles in finding that Article 
11 guarantees apply to all assemblies—except those with violent 
intentions on behalf of the organizers or that deny central tenets of a 
democratic society. Citing a previous decision in Sergey Kuznetsov v. 
Russia, the Court stated that “any measures interfering with the 
freedom of assembly and expression other than in cases of incitement 
to violence or rejection of democratic principles—however shocking 
and unacceptable certain views or words used may appear to the 
authorities—do a disservice to democracy and often even endanger 
it.”111 Ultimately, the Court found that the planned pride events would 
not have risen to the level of controversy that the government claimed 
it would.112 Additionally, the comments of Muscovite officials 
demonstrated that the primary concern was not the behavior of the 
participants, but their open identification as sexual minorities. 
 
108 The Mayor’s comments that those who deviate from “normal principles in 
organizing one’s sexual life” should not publicly display their “deviations,” coupled with 
deputy mayor Shvetsova’s remark that propaganda in favor of LGBT rights could be 
considered “propaganda for immorality,” clearly show that concern for public morals was 
paramount to Moscow’s government. PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 3. 
109 Alekseyev ¶ 78. 
110 Id. ¶ 79. In fact, during the domestic proceedings, the government relied solely on 
public safety grounds as justification for the ban, while ignoring the public morality 
arguments that it would eventually make before the Court. Id. 
111 Id. ¶ 80 (citing Sergey Kuznetsov v. Russia, No. 10877/04, ¶ 45 (2008)). Underlying 
this point is the concept that conditioning minority rights on acceptance by the majority is 
counter to the foundational principles of the Convention. As the Court points out, if 
minority rights are contingent on majority approval, then minority rights of religion, 
expression, and assembly would be merely theoretical and not practical, as required by the 
European Convention. Alekseyev ¶ 81 (citations omitted). 
112 Both Alekseyev and the government acknowledge that there was no nudity or other 
graphic, obscene activities planned; the government also acknowledged that its 
condemnation of homosexuality was limited to expressions in the public sphere. Id. ¶ 82. 
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C. Margin of Appreciation 
The Court also rejected the government’s margin of appreciation 
argument, which rested on the theory that a lack of consensus in 
Europe on LGBT issues justified its approach to public expressions of 
homosexuality and support of gay rights. This rejection is not entirely 
surprising, given the Court’s recent jurisprudence on the margin of 
appreciation doctrine in the context of LGBT rights.113 The Court 
referred to established case law that reflected a “long-standing 
European consensus” on a variety of matters concerning gay rights: 
decriminalization of consensual homosexual relations between adults, 
military service, and parental rights are just some examples.114 
Regardless of the presence of consensus, it still requires authorities to 
not overstep this margin by acting “arbitrarily.”115 
The presence of general consensus in support of LGBT rights of 
assembly amongst member states led the Court to reject the 
government’s margin of appreciation doctrine. The Court also 
reiterated its position that “any decision restricting the exercise of 
freedom of assembly must be based on an acceptable assessment of 
the relevant facts.”116 Since the only factor that Moscow’s 
government took into account before banning the pride events was 
public opposition and personal views on morals, it failed to meet this 
burden.117 This conclusion, combined with the Court’s rejection of the 
 
113 As one commentator has noted, despite some inconsistencies in application there 
has been a “progressive narrowing” of the margin of appreciation the Court grants states in 
respect to sexual orientation issues since the 1980s. Johnson, supra note 82, at 589. 
Johnson points out that the Court has relied on the presence of European consensus only in 
certain circumstances concerning gay rights. For example, the Court considered Europe’s 
lack of consensus on same-sex marriage in allowing for a wide margin of appreciation in 
E.B. v. France, but did not consider the margin of appreciation doctrine at all in another 
case concerning same-sex adoption. Id. at 589–90. 
114 Alekseyev ¶ 83. Despite this general consensus, there are still some areas where 
Europe is divided on the extent of LGBT liberty (specifically marriage), and the Court has 
generally allowed a wide margin of appreciation to countries on these issues. 
115 Id. The Court emphasized that states’ margin of appreciation “goes hand in hand 
with European supervision.” This supervision defeated the Russian government’s 
argument that the Court was acting as a court of fourth instance. See HARRIS ET AL., supra 
note 81. It also noted that any absence of European consensus was irrelevant in this case 
because there is a fundamental difference between conferring substantive rights on 
homosexuals (such as marriage) and recognizing their right to campaign for those 
substantive rights. No other member states are ambiguous on the right of homosexuals to 
openly identify as such, or prevent homosexuals from exercising rights of free assembly. 
116 Id. ¶ 85. 
117 As the Court took care to note, the mayor of Moscow and his government strived to 
keep homosexuality out of the public sphere based on the notion that homosexuality is a  
500 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 14, 473 
government’s alleged legitimate aims and margin of appreciation 
arguments, led the Court to conclude that the government’s ban on 
LGBT-identified public events “did not correspond to a pressing 
social need and was thus not necessary in a democratic society,” 
thereby violating Alekseyev’s Article 11 rights.118 
D. Other Violations 
While the Article 11 violation was the thrust of this case, the Court 
also found that the government violated Alekseyev’s right to an 
effective remedy under Article 13 of the European Convention, and 
did so with discriminatory purposes, a violation of Article 14.119 
Article 13 was violated because the domestic courts and laws were 
structured to make a successful appeal on a ban effectively 
impossible.120 For a remedy to be effective, there must be the 
 
conscious, anti-social choice. Not only did the government fail to offer any evidence to 
justify this conclusion, but the Court pointed out that “[t]here is no scientific evidence or 
sociological data at the Court’s disposal suggesting that the mere mention of 
homosexuality, or open public debate about sexual minorities’ social status, would 
adversely affect children or ‘vulnerable adults.’” Id. ¶ 86. 
118 Id. ¶¶ 87–88. 
119 Article 13 of the Convention reads: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set 
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national 
authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity.” European Convention, supra note 49, at art. 13. Article 14, governing 
the prohibition of discrimination, states that “[t]he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as 
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” Id. at art. 14. 
120 For the Article 13 claim, Alekseyev argued that he was denied an effective remedy 
for the Article 11 violation because there was no procedure in place to guarantee him a 
final decision before the planned date of the march. The government countered this 
argument by pointing to available judicial remedies, some of which Alekseyev did not 
attempt to pursue. Alekseyev ¶¶ 90, 92. The government also argued that the event 
organizers waited too long before filing court and administrative challenges, casting doubt 
on Alekseyev’s argument that a judicial remedy would not have been provided before the 
planned date of the events. Alekseyev responded by saying that he had filed the appeals as 
soon as he received the full text of the judgment; furthermore, he claimed that due to the 
notice provisions in the Assemblies Act and the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure 
concerning the entry of judgments into force, any first-instance judgments or appeals 
would necessarily become final only after the planned date of the events. Article 7(1) of 
the Assemblies Act holds that notices of public events must be submitted to the governing 
body “within the period not earlier than fifteen and not later than ten days prior to the 
holding of the public event.” Notices for pickets must be submitted no later than three days 
of the event. Assemblies Act at art. 7(1). For example, the events planned for May 27, 
2006, were banned by the first-instance court on May 26. There was no possible way to 
seek redress in a manner that would allow the events to proceed the following day. Any 
judicial decision overturning the ban would have been retrospective and, consequentially, 
futile towards remedying the damage of the ban. The Court sided with Alekseyev, relying  
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possibility of obtaining a ruling before the planned time of the event 
in question: “It is . . . important for the effective enjoyment of 
freedom of assembly that the applicable laws provide for reasonable 
time-limits within which the State authorities . . . should act.”121 The 
Court easily found an Article 14 violation, referring to government 
officials’ own statements as evidence that bias was the driving force 
behind the bans.122 Because the Court had previously found that the 
main reason for the ban was government disapproval of public events 
aimed at promoting homosexuality, and because it found an 
undeniable link between officials’ discriminatory statements and the 
ban, it concluded that there had been unjustified discrimination 
against Alekseyev in the violation of his Article 11 right.123 
Ultimately, the Court found that Russia had violated all three of the 
Articles in question by illegally denying the right of Alekseyev to 
exercise his freedom of assembly, based on discriminatory purposes, 
and by not providing him with a timely, effective remedy.124 
 
on the idea that “the timing of public events is crucial for the organisers and participants.” 
Alekseyev ¶ 98. As mentioned in Part II, supra p. 102, Alekseyev and Gay Russia 
specifically scheduled pride for May 27 in order to mark the anniversary of the 
decriminalization of homosexuality in the Russian Federation. 
121 Alekseyev ¶ 98. 
122 Relying on Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11, Alekseyev alleged that the 
government violated his Article 11 rights because of his sexual orientation, saying that it 
was clear that the real reason for the ban was official disapproval of his moral standing. Id. 
¶¶ 101, 105. Sexual orientation is covered under Article 14, as the Court found in Kozak v. 
Poland in 2010. “Furthermore,” the Court wrote in that opinion, “when the distinction in 
question operates in this intimate and vulnerable sphere of an individual’s private life, 
particularly weighty reasons need to be advanced before the Court to justify the measure 
complained of.” Kozak v. Poland, No. 13102/02, ¶ 92 (2010). The margin of appreciation 
afforded to states in the context of sexual orientation is narrow, and the principle of 
proportionality “does not merely require the measure chosen to be suitable in general for 
realising the aim sought; it must also be shown that it was necessary in the circumstances.” 
Alekseyev ¶ 108. As found by the Court and reiterated by the Council of Europe’s 
Parliamentary Assembly, “a difference in treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective 
and reasonable justification.” Resolution 1728, supra note 65, § 2. The government denied 
Alekseyev’s allegations, arguing that there was no discriminatory intent behind the ban. 
The government acknowledged the “existence” of sexual minorities and the necessity of 
addressing discrimination against LGBT Russians; however, it argued that “in view of 
their antagonistic relations with religious groups, it could prove necessary to place 
restrictions on the exercise of their rights.” Alekseyev ¶ 104. 
123 The Court also determined that the government had not provided any justification 
showing that the impugned distinction was compatible with Convention standards. Id. ¶ 
109. 
124 The decision was issued October 21, 2010, and referred to the Grand Chamber of 
the European Court of Human Rights. The Grand Chamber rejected the referral request on 
April 11, 2011, thereby making the Court’s decision final. Press Release, European Court  
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Alekseyev requested €40,000 in non-pecuniary damages and 
approximately €17,500 in legal fees before both domestic courts and 
the European Court. The Court awarded Alekseyev the full amount of 
legal fees and €12,000 in damages, resulting in a €29,500 fine for the 
Russian government. While the government is expected to pay the 
fine, whether or not this case will have an impact on Russia’s 
approach to LGBT rights, especially Article 11 rights, is yet to be 
seen, though recent developments have not been promising.125 
V 
IMPLICATIONS 
There are three main issues to consider when assessing the 
implications of Alekseyev for Russia and for sexual minorities who 
are denied their rights under the European Convention. First, the 
ruling reinforces the strength of LGBT freedom of assembly in 
Europe. Second, the Court’s decision represents a broadening 
understanding of gay rights in Europe. And third, the decision 
highlights the Russian government’s contracting stance towards 
recognition of homosexuality and protection of LGBT rights. These 
three variables lead to the conclusion that while the Russian state may 
continue to restrict LGBT rights, especially those involving public 
assembly, the European Court is ready to defend the rights of sexual 
minorities in Russia, with the strong support of the Council of Europe 
and other European institutions. 
A. LGBT Freedom of Assembly in Europe 
The primary effect of Alekseyev is its explicit recognition of a 
human right to public assembly and association for sexual minorities. 
This stance is a continuation of the court’s decision in Bączkowski, 
called the “most explicit statement on the obligation of states toward 
LGBT assemblies.”126 Explicit acknowledgement of sexual minority 
rights is especially important since the Convention does not mention 
 
of Human Rights, Court’s Judgment Concerning Repeated Unjustified Ban on Gay-Rights 
Marches in Moscow is Now Final (Apr. 15, 2011), available at http://www.echr.coe.int 
/echr/en/header/press/links/archived+news/archivesnews_2011.htm. 
125 Member states are required under the European Convention to comply with the 
decisions of the Court. See European Convention, supra note 49, at art. 46(1) (“Binding 
Force and Execution of Judgments.”). 
126 Holzhacker, supra note 60, at 18. Bączkowski is a case that “demonstrate[s] the 
Court’s heightened awareness of the unacceptability of discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation and its greater readiness to scrutinize cases coming before it in this 
regard.” HARRIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 598. 
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sexual orientation or gender identity as grounds of discrimination 
prohibited under Article 14 or Protocol No. 12.127 The decision in 
Alekseyev reinforces the notion that the Court is ready, willing, and 
able to scrutinize cases of sexual orientation discrimination.  
Additionally, Alekseyev gives judicial effect to the Committee of 
Ministers’ Recommendation on Discrimination.128 Incorporating this 
recommendation into the Court’s jurisprudence will only strengthen 
the position of LGBT persons claiming Article 11 violations under the 
European Convention. 
B. Pride in Europe 
The second notable aspect of the Alekseyev decision is its reflection 
of a growing understanding of LGBT rights in Europe, specifically 
the right of assembly. A 2011 report released by the Council of 
Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights noted that pride parades 
and other LGBT “cultural events” take place without problems in 
most member states.129 Despite this widening recognition, pride 
participants in Eastern Europe face a higher risk of government 
prohibition and assault than in most countries in Western Europe. At 
least twelve member states have banned or created administrative 
impediments for pride or other cultural LGBT events, including 
Poland, Turkey, Ukraine, Lithuania, and, of course, the Russian 
Federation.130 Aside from Russia, violence has been threatened or has 
 
127 See European Convention, supra note 49, at art. 14; Protocol No. 12 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1.1 
(2000). Despite the absence of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination, 
the European Court of Human Rights has recognized that Article 14 covers sexual 
orientation, and it is mentioned in the explanatory report to Protocol No. 12. Holzhacker, 
supra note 60, at 19. 
128 Paul Johnson, Russian Ban on Homosexual Propaganda Violates Human Rights, 
JURIST (Dec. 1, 2011, 8:12 AM), http://jurist.org/hotline/2011/12/paul-johnson-russia-lgbt 
.php. As discussed in Part III, the Recommendation on Discrimination is a comprehensive 
approach to conferring affirmative obligations on states to protect sexual minorities from 
discrimination, with a number of provisions aimed specifically at protecting freedom of 
expression and peaceful assembly. 
129 Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Europe, supra note 54, at 73. In July 2010, 
EuroPride in Warsaw became the first European-wide gay pride event held in Eastern 
Europe, drawing an estimated 8000 participants—a fitting transformation for the city 
where the Bączkowski case was born. Kamil Tchorek, Warsaw’s Gay Pride Reveals the 
Face of Modern Poland, GUARDIAN (July 19, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk 
/commentisfree/2010/jul/19/poland-gay-pride-warsaw. 
130 Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Europe, supra note 54, at 73–74. Another case 
concerning gay pride bans in Moldova is currently pending before the European Court of  
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erupted at gay pride events in Latvia, Hungary, Serbia, and Georgia; 
the Council of Europe has also documented violent attacks on pride 
parades in no less than fifteen member states, from Sweden to 
Ukraine, since 2004.131 
C. Restrictions on LGBT Freedom in Russia 
Even though the Court found multiple violations of Alekseyev’s 
rights and fined the Russian government, LGBT Russians still 
struggle to have their voice heard without government interference or 
prohibition. Despite active gay communities in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, the U.S. State Department has noted that “[s]ocietal 
animosity toward gays remain[s] strong.”132 In June 2011, the 
European Parliament adopted a resolution at the EU-Russia Summit 
in Nizhny Novgorod that explicitly voiced disapproval for the 
 
Human Rights. See Genderdoc-M v. Moldova, No. 9106/06 (2008), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-111394. 
131 The Long March: Gay Rights in Eastern Europe, ECONOMIST (Oct. 26, 2010), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2010/10/gay_rights_eastern_europe. 
The Economist notes that attacks on gay pride events in Eastern Europe “are part of a 
broader trend that has seen politics lurch to the right across the continent in recent years.” 
Id. See also Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Europe, supra note 54, at 75. Violence 
at pride parades is still very much a concern in a number of Eastern European countries; at 
the 2010 Pride parade in Belgrade, Serbia, riots erupted when anti-gay demonstrators 
clashed with police, resulting in over 140 injuries. Serbia Riots Leave Scores Injured, AL 
JAZEERA (Oct. 11, 2010), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe /2010/10/20101010154 
66495888.html. In 2011, approximately 10,000 anti-gay demonstrators attacked about 200 
LGBT activists and allies in Split, Croatia. Croatia: Don’t Force Change in Pride March 
Route, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 31, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/31 
/croatia-don-t-force-change-pride-march-route. Ukrainian gay rights activists cancelled the 
planned 2012 pride parade after threats of violence from anti-gay demonstrators, as well as 
assaults on activists themselves. Ukraine: Investigate Brutal Attack on Gay Activist, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 26, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/26/ukraine    
-investigate-brutal-attack-gay-activist. 
132 U.S. STATE DEP’T, 2010 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: 
RUSSIA (Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160474 
.pdf [hereinafter STATE DEP’T REPORT]. The report cites a number of hate crimes against 
gays in Russia over the past few years, focused largely around public pride events, 
including the kidnapping of Alekseyev by Muscovite security personnel. One gay 
Muscovite who recently obtained asylum in the United States because of sexuality-based 
persecution faced in Russia spoke with The Moscow Times about how difficult it was to be 
a known homosexual in Russia: “I participated in a nonsanctioned gay-pride parade at 
Vorobyovy Gory . . . It was ruthlessly suppressed. Participants were arrested. Those who 
were not arrested, myself included, were left bleeding, bruised and swollen.” Nikola 
Krastev, Why a Gay Muscovite Sought, and Won, U.S. Asylum, MOSCOW TIMES (Aug. 15, 
2012), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/why-a-gay-muscovite-sought-and    
-won-us-asylum/466605.html. 
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continuing ban on gay pride parades in spite of the Court’s ruling, 
saying that the Parliament: 
Regrets that, contrary to Russia’s obligations as a member of the 
Council of Europe to uphold freedom of assembly, peaceful 
citizens’ gatherings continue to be banned and violently dispersed, 
including a gay pride march in Moscow for the sixth consecutive 
year, disregarding a final ruling made in April 2011 by the 
European Court of Human Rights.133 
Regardless of the Parliament’s position, Russia (and particularly 
Moscow) has continued to restrict LGBT assemblies, as well as other 
rights. The Moscow government has refused to recognize the 
substance of the Court’s ruling in Alekseyev and continues to ban gay 
pride parades; in fact, the most recent attempt to hold a gay pride 
demonstration—in May 2012—ended in the arrest of about forty 
demonstrators from both sides, including Alekseyev.134 After Mayor 
Luzhkov was removed from his post by then-President Dmitri 
Medvedev in late 2010, gay rights activists had hoped that the new 
mayor, Sergei Sobyanin, would take a softer line on pride parades 
than his predecessor.135 However, Mayor Sobyanin explicitly stated in 
November 2011 that he would not allow gay pride parades to be held 
in Moscow, because Muscovites would oppose the event and their 
opinion “had to be ‘respected.’”136 Other government officials have 
been more vehement in their opposition to gay pride events. In 
response to attempts to organize a pride march, the governor of the 
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Tambov Region responded: “Tolerance?! Like Hell! Faggots should 
be torn apart. And their pieces should be thrown in the wind.”137 
The freedom of assembly is not the only right that has been 
restricted in the context of LGBT Russians in recent years. There has 
been significant attention to a new law in St. Petersburg purporting to 
prevent “homosexual propaganda,” which has largely been seen as an 
attempt to stifle gay expression. The law penalizes “public actions 
directed at the propaganda of sodomy, lesbianism, bisexuality and 
transgenderism among minors” with fines of up to USD 17,000, and 
defines homosexual propaganda as “the targeted and uncontrolled 
dissemination of generally accessible information capable of harming 
the health and moral and spiritual development of minors.”138 Aside 
from the well-known instances of LGBT discrimination in Russia, the 
U.S. State Department noted more common occurrences of 
discrimination in its annual human rights report: 
[T]he majority of gays hide their orientation due to fear of losing 
their jobs or their homes, as well as the threat of violence. . . . 
Medical practitioners . . . limit or deny gay and lesbian persons 
health services due to intolerance and prejudice. According to 
recent studies, gay men faced discrimination in workplace hiring 
practices. Openly gay men were targets for skinhead aggression; 
police often failed to respond out of indifference.139 
Additionally, LGBT Russians who attempt to use the European Court 
of Human Rights face potential harassment: “Amnesty International 
and other human rights groups reported past reprisals against 
applicants to the court, including killings, disappearances, and 
intimidation. According to press reports and human rights NGOs, as 
of September 2009 at least six applicants to the ECHR had been killed 
or abducted.”140 
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CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the Court’s decision will likely have little impact on 
local and regional governments, as evidenced by the actions in 
Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Krasnodar. However, Alekseyev is an 
important case within the broader context of LGBT human rights. It 
marks the first decision on gay rights in Russia from the European 
Court of Human Rights, continues the tradition of European 
recognition of LGBT rights to assembly and association that was 
started in Bączkowski, and explicitly finds a human right to assembly 
for sexual minorities attempting to express this right through gay 
pride events. Although the Russian Federation’s actions since the 
Court’s decision was finalized have demonstrated its unwillingness to 
recognize the rights of LGBT Russians to publicly express 
themselves, this decision strengthens the Court’s jurisprudence on gay 
rights, giving Russian activists a stronger platform from which to 
fight the government’s continued violations. In the meantime, Nikolai 
Alekseyev continues to fight for LGBT rights, defying Russian 
authorities with bold, public expressions of support for equality: “I 
don’t want to wait any more for my freedoms or civil rights as a gay 
man.”141 
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